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NOTES AND COMMENT
average man to face it alone .... ,39 The court has held the failure to
assign counsel to be a denial of due process where the defendant was
incapable of defending himself on trial by reason of his age, race, or
mentality ;40 where the trial court or its officers acted unfairly ;41 and
where the defendant was unable to conduct adequate defense because
of a complex charge or fact situation.42
The rule of the United States Supreme Court affecting the states
is thus similar to the North Carolina rule, but the "special circum-
stances" which require the assignment of counsel in non-capital cases
have been more thoroughly explored, and it is likely that the United
States rule is more liberal than the North Carolina rule. It appears
that a person accused of a non-capital crime in North Carolina today
has no assurance of an assignment of counsel.
The writer suggests that the United States Supreme Court has
maintained a strong and liberal policy on civil rights, including the right
to counsel in criminal cases, expressing a desire to leave the application
of this privilege in the hands of the several states. Thus, the function
of the states is to delineate a policy which will insure defendants in
non-capital cases a substantial constitutional right.
Roy W. DAvis, JR.
Corporations-Dissolution-Deadlock
The problem of corporate stockholder and/or director deadlock
is a familiar one to the practicing corporation lawyer.1 This deadlock
situation is, of course, only one of many problems which arise under
the general subject of dissolution of a corporation, for any cause, at
the instance of minority stockholders. The broader topic above referred
to has already been treated in this Law RevievP and therefore, the
" Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 682 (1948)." Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951) ("young irresponsible boy" of low
mentality); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948) (eighteen year old "youth
unfamiliar with court procedure") ; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663
(1947) (seventeen year old boy) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (Indian).
"'Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948) (defendant threatened by
state's attorney); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948) (court questioned
defendant about former criminal charges, of which he had been exonerated);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941) (false promises by officers of the court).
,2 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951) (defendant, convicted of robbery,
meant to plead guilty to breaking and entering) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773
(1949) (court said dounsel could have prevented admission of incriminating testi-
mony) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945) (venue problem of trial court's
jurisdiction over an Indian on reservation).
' For an excellent discussion of the problem in general, see Israels, Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 CH. L. RE v. 778 (1952).
'Note, 28 N. C. L. Rv. 313 (1950).
"Deadlock, which appears by the decided cases to have occurred only in cor-
porations having a few stockholders, implies dissension due to equal division, and
therefore does not involve problems of protection for the minority." Horstein,
A Remedy for Corporate Abuse, 40 COL. L. Rav. 220, 231 (1940).
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present note will be confined to a discussion only of deadlock situations,
which usually occur in closely held or "family" corporations in which
each group has 50% of the outstanding voting stock. These "glorified
partnerships" will be seen to be extremely vexing headaches when it
is realized that most courts, absent any specific statutory authority, will
not act to dissolve the corporation merely on the grounds of deadlock
or dissension.8
Although courts of equity, even in the absence of a statute, will
sometimes assume jurisdiction,4 the general rule still prevails that
unless specific statutory authority is given, the courts have no right
to interfere in the dispute.5
An increasing number of -decisions, however, seem to exhibit a
willingness to assume jurisdiction where there would be irreparable
injury to the corporation, where the interests of the stockholders may
'Alabama Coal and Coke Co. v. Shackleford, 137 Ala. 224, 34 So. 833 (1903)
(director's terms expired; equity refused to act) ; Drob v. National Memorial
Park, Inc., 28 Del. Ch. 254, 41 A 2d 589 (1945) (no dissolution because there
was a Board of Directors); Lush'us Brand Lithograph Co. v. Fort Dearborn
Lithograph Co., 330 Ill. App. 216, 70 N. E. 2d 737 (1946) ; Wallace v. Pierce-
Wallace Publishing Co., 101 Iowa 313, 70 N. W. 216 (1897) ("a situation into
which the parties voluntarily placed themselves," and equity court would not
dissolve); Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S. W. 2d 625 (1937) ; Mc-
Guire v. Kayser-McGuire Co., 184 Minn. 553, 239 N. W. 616 (1931), commented
on in Note, 16 MINN. L. Rv. 707 (1932); Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N. J. Eq.
444, 54 A. 2d 761 (1947) (deadlock; statute applied to even number of directors
and court would not dissolve because there were 3 directors) ; Bowman v. Gum,
Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184 At. 258 (1936); McKay v. Beard, 20 S. C. 156 (1882)
(refusal of one of the two incorporators-stockholders to be bound by the by-laws
did not work a dissolution); Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S. W. 2d 630 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1949).
"Dissension, then, would seem not to be an independent ground for dissolution
but rather a contributing element to the factual situation necessary for relief on
one of the other grounds." Note, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 714, 720 (1943).
See also: Anno. 13 A. L. R. 2d 1261 (1950).
'Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 F. 2d 246, cert. denied, 299 U. S. 567 (1936) ; Vale
v. Atlantic Coast and Inland Corp., - Del. Ch. -, 99 A. 2d 396 (1953) (no
specific deadlock statute but court held the complaint sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.
But see Hall v. Woods, 325 II. 114, 156 N.E. 258 (1927). In this case the
court held that part of the stock, owned by a foreign corporation, cannot be voted
and therefore there is no deadlock. On a petition to rehear, the court suggested
how such stock could be voted but then said that it would not anticipate a dead-
lock (which would occur whenever the excluded stock was allowed a vote).
' Cases cited note 3 supra; BALANTINE, CoaRoarONS § 304 (Rev. ed., 1946);
16 FLETcHER, CYC. CORORATION S § 8080 and § 8098 (Rev. ed. 1942); STmvNs,
CoRPoRaTIONS § 199 (2nd ed., 1949) ; Note, 47 MicE. L. REv. 684 (1949).
8Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W. 2d 944 (1950); Guaranty
Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P. 2d 974 (1948) ; Application of
Radom, 282 App. Div. 854, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (1st Dep't 1953) (evidence did
not establish deadlock or frustration of corporate activities by lack of a board
of directors; dissolution denied).
But under statutes which state that corporations may be dissolved "for good
cause shown," courts have refused to dissolve on the mere fact of deadlock alone.




suffer,7 or where the court says that these corporations are mere part-
nerships.8  Notwithstanding these more liberal interpretations of appli-
cable laws or of equitable jurisdiction without a particular law, there
is still a need for definite statutory authority in this field.
The present state of the North Carolina law on this point is in
doubt. The relevant statutes set out various methods of involuntary
dissolution at the instance of private persons,9 stockholders, 0 or the
Attorney-General," but in the opinion of writers on the subject, these
statutes are not specific enough to encompass the problem at hand'
2
Therefore an examination of pertinent corporation laws in other states
is necessary in order to be able to formulate a suggested addition to
Chapter 55 of the General Statutes.
Some states merely give their equity courts the power to dissolve
corporations "whenever any good and sufficient reason exists,"' 3 or
when liquidation is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights of the stockholders or creditors."'14 In this writer's opinion,
such statutes are far from adequate for the reason that these courts
tend to give an undue amount of weight to various factors such as
'Petition of Collins-Doan Co. 3 N. J. 382, 70 A. 2d 159 (1949) ; Application
of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949); Re Waldorf
Amusement Co., 13 Ohio App. 438 (1928).
I Flemming v. Heffner-Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1933);
Green v. National Advertising and Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056
(1917). Note, 22 V. L. R.v. 469, 470 (1936).
Israels, Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Ci. L. REv. 778, 792 (1952), ad-
vances the theory of considering the participants in a stalemated close corporation
as joint venturers as between themselves.
Contra: Freedman v. Fox, -Fla.-, 67 So. 2d 692 (1953); Cohen v. Wacht,
-Misc.-, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 207 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-124 (1950).
'0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125 (1950).
'1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-126 (1950) which provides in part:
..... It is the duty of the Attorney General, whenever he has reason to
believe that any.of these acts or omissions can be established by proof, to bring
an action in every case of public interest, and also it every other case in which
satisfactory security is given to indemnify the state. . . " (italics added)
In response to a North Carolina attorney's contention that the Attorney Gen-
eral was required under this clause to bring action in a situation where two per-
sons each owned 50% of the stock and could not elect a third director, the
Attorney General replied; ". . . I do not think that it would be proper for me
to authorize one of the parties in the controversy to institute an action in the
name of the Attorney General." Letter from Attorney-General, Aug. 12, 1953.
A subsequent letter states that "I am not satisfied that the failure of the
tlirectors . . .to agree upon . . . a third director . . . would in itself justify
an action to dissolve. . . ." The Attorney General then suggests that it might
be possible to proceed under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-114 (1950), but this gives
the court the right to contime the corporation whereas in the majority of cases,
a dissolution is desired. Letter from Attorney-General, Aug. 20, 1953.
1 Israels, Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 CI. L. REv. 778 (1952). The writer
in Note, 28 N. C. LAw REv. 313, 315 (1950), discusses in some detail the rele-
vant North Carolina cases on involuntary dissolution and concludes that ". . . all
the presently appropriate circumstances for dissolution are not covered by statute
in North Carolina." Supra at 318.
"t CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5226 (1949).
11 N. H. REV. LAws c. 274, § 96 (1942).
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solvency 15 or impossibility of carrying out corporate purpose,', and do
not squarely face the issue of paralysis in the management because of
a deadlock.
Other legislatures have adopted the provision set out in the Model
Business Corporation Act.'7 Even this paragon was elaborated upon
by some states which adopted the Model Act clause verbatim and then
supplemented it with additional sections pertaining not only to director
deadlocks but also to situations where no new directors can be elected
because of a stockholder deadlock which has extended over a period of
time, usually two successive annual meetings. 18 Consequently, the
Model Act was amended in 1952 so as to include this additional pro-
vision.19
Another group of states have statutes 20 derived from the New York
General Corporation Law, the pertinent section of which is as follows:
* .. If a corporation has an even number of directors who are
equally divided respecting the management of its affairs, or if
the votes of its stockholders are so 'divided that they cannot elect
a Board of Directors, the holders of one-half of the stock . . .
may present a verified petition for dissolution .... 21
1" The Mississippi Statute specifically provides for liquidation if the corpora-
tion ". . . ceases to be a going concern." Miss. CODE ANN. § 5355 (1942).
16 Olechny v. Thadeus Kosciuszko Society, 128 Conn. 534, 24 A. 2d 249 (1942)
(dissolution denied, but the court admitted that the test to be applied was im-
possibility of corporate purpose).
17 MODEL BUSINESS CoRORaTrON AcT § 90 (1950) : "The courts shall have full
power to liquidate . . . a corporation . . . when it is established . . . that the
directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to
the corporation is being suffered or is threatened by reason thereof." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 301.49 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485 (Vernon 1949);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2852-1107 (1938).16ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 57.86 (Supp. 1952) ; Wimp Packing Co. v. Wimp,
313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942) ; Wiedoeft v. Frank Holton & Co., 294
Ill. App. 118, 13 N. E. 2d 854 (1938) (statute to be strictly construed); Wis.
STAT. § 180.771 (1951), as amended by Wis. Laws 1953, c. 399, §§ 49, 50.
Of the laws examined, the California statute seems to the writer to meet the
situation most adequately. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 4651 (1948).
1" "The courts shall have full power to liquidate..,. a corporation . .. when
it is established . . . that the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and
have failed, for a period which includes at least two annual meeting dates, to
elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired
upon the election of their successors .. " MODEL BusiNESS CORPORATION Aar
§ 90 (1952 Revision).
2 FLA. LAws 1953, § 608.28, p. 631; Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.570 (1948), as
amended by Ky. Laws 1952, c. 116; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.55 (1950); N. J.
REv. STAT. § 14:13-15 (Supp. 1953); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 1701.94 (1938);
WASH. REv. CODE § 23:44:030 (1952).
'IN. Y. GENERAL CORPORATIoN LAW § 103 (Supp. 1953). It is to be noted
that this statute does not say "irreparable damage" like the Model Act, but as
construed by the New York Courts, this statute is to be read in connection with
N. Y. General Corporation Law § 117 which states that the dissolution must be
beneficial to the stockholders. It has been held that this test is not met when
the corporation is financially sound. Re Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N. Y. S.
2d 604 (1st Dep't 1949).
[Vol. 32
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But even with the above type of statute, the decisions show that
the courts are still overly conscious of the old rule, and therefore tend
to construe strictly the applicable statute.22  For example, the New
York Court has denied dissolution in cases where the evidence did
not establish that corporate activities were frustrated by lack of a board
of directors,2 where dissolution would not be in the best interest of
the stockholders,24 and where it was claimed that there was in fact an
existing deadlock and one of the three directors was merely a "dummy"
who refused to act.25  Therefore it would seem that any proposed
statute should be -definite enough to meet the deadlock situation in
general, while retaining sufficient elasticity to enable the court adequately
to cope with specific problems which might arise.
The North Carolina General Statutes Commission has drafted a
deadlock statute as part of a revised corporation law for submission to
the 1955 General Assembly. The latest draft of this proposed law
would give the superior court the power to liquidate a corporation when
it is established that:
(1) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the stockholders are unable to break the
deadlock, so that the business can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of all the shareholders; or
(2) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and for
that reason have been unable at two consecutive annual
meetings to elect successors to directors whose term had
expired; . . .
This proposal is an adoption of the present Illinois statute,2 6 with
the exception of the last clause in subsection (1), which has been
changed from the Illinois requirement of actual or threatened "irre-
parable injury to the corporation." This change is a commendable
one because presumably the inclusion of the phrase "to the advantage
of all of the shareholders" would give the court, in its discretion, power
2Wimp Packing Co. v. Wimp, 313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942);
In re Belton, 47 La. 1614, 18 So. 642 (1896) (failure to elect officers does not work
a dissolution) ; Dorf v. Hill Bus. Co., 140 N. J. Eq. 444, 54 A. 2d 761 (1947).
But see In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 15 N. J. Super. 58, 83 A. 2d 38 (1951)
(the test used here was not solvency but whether or not there was a corporate
paralysis).
"Application of Radom, 282 App. Div. 854, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (1st Dep't
1953).
2, Application of Numode Realty Co., Inc., 278 App. Div. 979, 105 N. Y. S.
2d 588 (2nd Dep't 1951).
"'Petition of Binder, 172 Misc. 634, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1939), re-
versed without opinion, 258 App. Div. 1041, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 1020 (1st Dep't 1940)
(remanded with instructions for referee to find out whether the third director
was in fact a "dummy").
"ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 57.86 (Supp. 1952).
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to liquidate even a solvent concern if the internal dissension reached
a point where such action would be the only feasible solution. It was
presumably the intention of the Drafting Committee that by making
the above change, the North Carolina courts will be able to take a
more liberal attitude than has the Supreme Court of Illinois2 7 under
their similar statute.
Subsection (1) of the proposed statute seems very adequately to
provide a solution in any director deadlock situation. This section also!
seems applicable to stockholder deadlocks by the clause "and the stock-
holders are unable to break the deadlock. ' 28  The need for specific
reference to stockholder deadlock is vividly brought out in the case of
Cook v. Cook29 where, although there was a 50-50 stock division, the
applicable statute dealt with director deadlocks and therefore relief
was denied.
If however the situation should arise where there is an uneven split
among directors, but the stockholders become deadlocked so that it
is impossible to elect a new board, then subsection (2) could be put
into use.
The California30 and West Virginia3 1 statutes have an additional
section which in essence allows the defendant stockholders, if they wish
to prevent dissolution,,to purchase the plaintiff's stock at a fair market
value set by the court. In the opinion of this writer, the above pro-
vision, which would preserve the going concern and possibly prevent
hardship to some defendants, is an excellent addition and serious thought
should be given as to the possibility and advisability of incorporating
it into the new proposal.
The need for this statute is amply shown by case law on the subject
and the fact that four states, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Wis-
consin, following the example set by the recent change in the Model
Act, adopted similar laws or amended old laws at the last meeting of
their legislatures. In order to clarify the vague and inadequate state
of the North Carolina law on involuntary dissolution, it is hoped that
2 Lush'us Brand Lithograph Co. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 Ill.
App. 216, 70 N. E. 2d 737 (1946) (statute to be strictly construed)." This writer is convinced that the proposed statute would be a sufficient
remedy for any conceivable deadlock situation, but should there be any doubt
as to its applicability to stockholder deadlocks, the California Code has a perti-
nent section which provides for dissolution if "there is internal dissension and
two or more factors of shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked that
its business cannot be conducted with advantage to its shareholders." CAL. Corn.
CoD § 4651(d) (1948).
270 Mass. 534, 170 N. E. 455 (1930). After this case the Massachusetts
statute was amended, to include the clause "or if the votes of its stockholders are
equally divided in the election of directors." See also: Wimp Packing Co. v.
Wimp, 313 Ill. App. 262, 39 N. E. 2d 720 (1942) ; In. re Hedberg-Freidheim Co.,
233 Minn. 534, 47 N. W. 2d 424 (1951).
'o CAL. CoRp. CODE ANN. § 4658 (1948).
*1W. VA. CODE AxN. § 3093 (1949).
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the next legislature will give careful consideration to the proposed cor-
poration laws, with special emphasis on a remedy for the deadlock
situation.
R. C. VAUGHN, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Coverage of Maintenance
Employees of Office Buildings
Maintenance employees in office buildings present a real problem
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their employer is frequently
a corporation whose sole business is that of renting space in local build-
ings, although the employer may be a manufacturing company or a bank
using a part of the building for its own offices and renting the balance.
Where all or part of the building is rented, the tenants may be engaged
in purely local business, or in interstate commerce either on or off the
premises, or in the production of goods for commerce either in the build-.
ing or at another location. The maintenance employees themselves sel-
dom have any direct contact with the carrying on of interstate commerce
or with the physical production of goods for commerce. They clean the
building, operate the elevators, make repairs, guard and heat the prem-
ises, and perform a variety of other activities admittedly essential to
the successful operation of the modern office building. The question
which arises in each case, however, is whether such activities are so
closely related to commerce or production of goods for commerce as
to bring the maintenance employees under the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
Coverage under the act is dependent on the activities of the em-
ployee rather than on the business of the employer. Thus the employees
may be under the act even though the employer is a local real estate
firm and therefore clearly not engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce.' On the other hand, the employees may not
be covered even though their employer is engaged in commerce.
2
Any employee is covered who is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce,3 the latter including any closely
related process or occupation directly essential to the production of
goods for commerce. 4 In this connection it is necessary to distinguish
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
Carrigan v. Provident Trust Co., 153 F. 2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1946); Building
Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., 142 F. 2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1944).
'52 STAT. 1062, 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (1946), as amended,
63 STAT. 912 (1949), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (Supp. 1953). See LIVENGOOD, THE
FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LA v (American Law Institute 1952); Tyson, The
Fair Labor Standard Avwndments of 1949, 28 N. C. L. REv. 161 (1950).
'52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
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